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Unconditionally Secure Quantum Key Distribution
In Higher Dimensions
H. F. Chau, Member, IEEE
Abstract— In search of a quantum key distribution scheme that
could stand up for more drastic eavesdropping attack, I discover
a prepare-and-measure scheme using N -dimensional quantum
particles as information carriers where N is a prime power.
Using the Shor-Preskill-type argument, I prove that this scheme
is unconditional secure against all attacks allowed by the laws of
quantum physics. Incidentally, for N = 2n > 2, each information
carrier can be replaced by n entangled qubits. And in this case, I
discover an eavesdropping attack on which no unentangled-qubit-
based prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution scheme
known to date can generate a provably secure key. In contrast,
this entangled-qubit-based scheme produces a provably secure
key under the same eavesdropping attack whenever N ≥ 16.
This demonstrates the advantage of using entangled particles as
information carriers to combat certain eavesdropping strategies.
Index Terms— Entanglement purification, local quantum op-
eration, phase error correction, quantum key distribution, Shor-
Preskill proof, two way classical communication, unconditional
security
I. INTRODUCTION
KEY distribution is the art of sharing a secret key betweentwo cooperative players Alice and Bob in the presence
of an eavesdropper Eve. If Alice and Bob distribute their key
by exchanging classical messages only, Eve may at least in
principle wiretap their conversations without being caught. So,
given unlimited computational resources, Eve can crack the
secret key. In contrast, in any attempt to distinguish between
two non-orthogonal states, information gain is only possible
at the expenses of disturbing the state [1]. Therefore, if Alice
and Bob distribute their secret key by sending non-orthogonal
quantum signals, any eavesdropping attempt will almost surely
affect their signal fidelity. Consequently, a carefully designed
quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme allows Alice and
Bob to accurately determine the quantum channel error rate,
which in turn reflects the eavesdropping rate. If the estimated
quantum channel error rate is too high, Alice and Bob abort
the scheme and start all over again. Otherwise, they perform
certain privacy amplification procedures to distill out an almost
perfectly secure key [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. Therefore, it is
conceivable that a provably secure QKD scheme exists even
when Eve has unlimited computational power.
With this belief in mind, researchers proposed many QKD
schemes [6]. These schemes differ in many ways such as
the Hilbert space dimension of the quantum particles used,
as well as the states and bases Alice and Bob prepared
and measured. The first QKD scheme, commonly known as
BB84, was invented by Bennett and Brassard [7]. In BB84,
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Alice randomly and independently prepares each qubit in one
of the following four states: |0〉, |1〉 and (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2,
and sends them to Bob. Upon reception, Bob randomly and
independently measures each qubit in either the {|0〉, |1〉} or
{(|0〉±|1〉)/√2} bases [7]. In short, BB84 is an experimentally
feasible prepare-and-measure scheme involving the transfer
of unentangled qubits [6]. Later, Bruß introduced another
experimentally feasible prepare-and-measure scheme known
as the six-state scheme [8]. In her scheme, Alice randomly
and independently prepares each qubit in one of the following
six states: |0〉, |1〉, (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2 and (|0〉 ± i|1〉)/√2; and
Bob measures each of them randomly and independently in
the following three bases: {|0〉, |1〉}, {(|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2} and
{(|0〉 ± i|1〉)/√2}. Although the six-state scheme is more
complex and generates a key less efficiently, Bruß found that
it tolerates higher noise level than BB84 if Eve attacks each
qubit individually [8]. In addition to qubit-based schemes such
as BB84 and the six-state scheme, a number of QKD schemes
involving higher dimensional as well as continuous systems
have been proposed [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16].
Most importantly, studies showed that many schemes involving
higher dimensional systems result in a lower fidelity of the
quantum signal than those involving qubits under individual
particle attack [13], [14], [15], [16], [17].
Are these QKD schemes really secure? Is it really true
that the six-state scheme tolerates higher error level than
BB84? The answers to these questions turn out to be highly
non-trivial. Recall that the all powerful Eve may choose to
attack the transmitted qubits collectively by applying a unitary
operator to entangle these qubits with her quantum particles.
In this situation, most of our familiar tools such as law of
large numbers and classical probability theory do not apply
to the resultant highly entangled non-classical state. These
make rigorous cryptanalysis of BB84 and the six-state schemes
extremely difficult.
In spite of these difficulties, a few air-tight security proofs
against all possible eavesdropping attacks for BB84 and the
six-state scheme have been discovered. Rigorous proofs for
QKD schemes with better error tolerance capability are also
found. After a few years of work, Mayers [4] and Biham et al.
[18] eventually proved the security of BB84 against all kinds
of attack allowed by the known laws of quantum physics. In
particular, Mayers showed that in BB84 a provably secure key
can be generated whenever the channel bit error rate is less
than about 7% [4]. (A precise definition of bit error rate can
be found in Def. 4 in Subsection IV-A.) Along a different line,
Lo and Chau [3] proved the security of an entanglement-based
QKD scheme that applies up to 1/3 bit error rate by means of a
random hashing technique based on entanglement purification
2[19]. Their security proof is conceptually simple and appeal-
ing. Nevertheless, their scheme requires quantum computers
and hence is not practical at this moment. By ingeniously
combining the essence of Mayers and Lo-Chau proofs, Shor
and Preskill gave a security proof of BB84 that applies up to
11.0% bit error rate [20]. This is a marked improvement over
the 7% bit error tolerance rate in Mayers’ proof. Since then, the
Shor-Preskill proof became a blueprint for the cryptanalysis
of many QKD schemes. For instance, Lo [21] as well as
Gottesman and Lo [22] extended it to cover the six-state QKD
scheme. At the same time, the work of Gottesman and Lo
also demonstrates that careful use of local quantum operation
plus two way classical communication (LOCC2) increases the
error tolerance rate of QKD [22]. Furthermore, they found
that the six-state scheme tolerates a higher bit error rate than
BB84 because the six-state scheme gives better estimates for
the three Pauli error rates [22]. In search of a qubit-based
QKD scheme that tolerates higher bit error rate, Chau recently
discovered an adaptive entanglement purification procedure
inspired by the technique used by Gottesman and Lo in
Ref. [22]. He further gave a Shor-Preskill-based proof showing
that this adaptive entanglement purification procedure allows
the six-state scheme to generate a provably secure key up to
a bit error rate of (5 − √5)/10 ≈ 27.6% [23], making it
the most error-tolerant prepare-and-measure scheme involving
unentangled qubits to date.
Unlike various qubit-based QKD schemes, a rigorous se-
curity proof against the most general type of eavesdropping
attack on a QKD scheme involving higher dimensional quan-
tum systems is lacking. Besides, the error tolerance capability
for this kind of QKD schemes against the most general
eavesdropping attack is virtually unexplored. In fact, almost all
relevant cryptanalysis focus on individual particle attack; and
they suggest that QKD schemes involving higher dimensional
systems may be more error-tolerant [13], [14], [15], [17]. It
is, therefore, instructive to give air-tight security proofs and
analyze the error tolerance capability for this type of schemes.
In this paper, I analyze the security and error tolerance
capability of a prepare-and-measure QKD scheme involving
the transmission of higher dimensional quantum systems. In
fact, this scheme makes use of N -dimensional quantum states
prepared and measured randomly in (N + 1) different bases.
Because of the randomization of bases, the probabilities of
certain kinds of quantum errors in the transmitted signal
are correlated. This makes the error estimation effective and
hence the error tolerance rate high. Nonetheless, the high
error tolerance rate comes with a price, namely, that the
efficiency of the scheme is lowered. Now, let me first begin by
briefly reviewing the general assumptions on the capabilities
of Alice, Bob and Eve together with a precisely stated security
requirement for a general QKD scheme in Section II. Then,
I introduce an entanglement-based QKD scheme involving
the transmission of N -dimensional quantum systems where
N is a prime power in Section III and prove its security
against the most general eavesdropping attack in Section IV.
By standard Shor and Preskill reduction argument, I arrive at
the provably secure prepare-and-measure scheme in Section V.
Since one may use n possibly entangled qubits to represent
an N -dimensional quantum state whenever N = 2n, I obtain
an unconditionally secure prepare-and-measure QKD scheme
based on entangled qubits. This entangled-qubit-based QKD
scheme offers a definitive advantage over all currently known
unentangled-qubit-based ones on combating certain kind of
eavesdropping strategies. More precisely, there is a specific
eavesdropping attack that creates a bit error rate too high
for any unentangled-qubit-based prepare-and-measure QKD
scheme known to date to generate a provably secure key.
In contrast, the same eavesdropping attack does not prevent
this entangled-qubit-based preapre-and-measure scheme from
producing a provably secure key whenever N ≥ 16. But on the
other hand, there is another specific eavesdropping attack that
the entangled-qubit-based scheme cannot generate a provably
secure key while the unentangled-qubit-based prepare-and-
measure scheme proposed by Chau in Ref. [23] can. Thus,
using entangled particles as information carriers is a feasible
way to generate a secure key under certain drastic eavesdrop-
ping attack. Lastly, I give a brief summary in Section VI.
II. GENERAL FEATURES AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
FOR QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
In QKD, we assume that Alice and Bob have access to two
communication channels. The first one is an insecure noisy
quantum channel. The other one is an unjammable noiseless
authenticated classical channel in which everyone, including
Eve, can listen to but cannot alter the content passing through
it. We also assume that Alice and Bob have complete control
over the apparatus in their own laboratories; and everything
outside their laboratories except the unjammable classical
channel may be manipulated by the all powerful Eve. We
further make the most pessimistic assumption that Eve is
capable of performing any operation in her controlled territory
that is allowed by the known laws of quantum physics [5], [6].
Given an unjammable classical channel and an insecure
quantum channel, a QKD scheme consists of three stages [2].
The first is the signal preparation and transmission stage where
quantum signals are prepared and exchanged between Alice
and Bob. The second is the signal quality test stage where a
subset of the exchanged quantum signals is measured in order
to estimate the eavesdropping rate in the quantum channel.
The final phase is the signal privacy amplification stage
where a carefully designed privacy amplification procedure is
performed to distill out an almost perfectly secure key.
No QKD scheme can be 100% secure as Eve may be lucky
enough to guess the preparation or measurement bases for each
quantum state correctly. Hence, it is more reasonable to de-
mand that the mutual information between Eve’s measurement
results after eavesdropping and the final secret key is less than
an arbitrary but fixed small positive number. Hence I adopt the
following definition of security.
Definition 1 (Based on Lo and Chau [3]): With the above
assumptions on the unlimited computational power of Eve,
a QKD scheme is said to be unconditionally secure with
security parameters (ǫp, ǫI) provided that whenever Eve has a
cheating strategy that passes the signal quality control test with
probability greater than ǫp, the mutual information between
3Eve’s measurement results after eavesdropping and the final
secret key is less than ǫI .
III. AN ENTANGLEMENT-BASED QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
In what follows, I first explicitly construct a unitary operator
T which plays a pivotal role in the design of the QKD scheme
in Subsection III-A. Then, I make use of the operator T to
construct the entanglement-based QKD scheme in Subsec-
tion III-B.
A. The Unitary Operator T
In the analysis of certain quantum error correcting codes,
Gottesman introduced a unitary operator that cyclically per-
mutes the σx, σy and σz errors by conjugation [24]. Later
on, Lo observed that conjugation by the same operator per-
mutes the three bases used by the six-state scheme, namely,
{|0〉, |1〉}, {(|0〉±|1〉)/√2} and {(|0〉±i|1〉)/√2}. He further
used the permuting property of this unitary operator to argue
that the σx, σy and σz error rates of the transmitted quantum
signals in the six-state scheme are equal [21]. This is an
important step in the analysis of the error tolerance rate of
the six-state scheme as it greatly restricts the possible form of
error in the transmitted quantum signals.
To devise a highly error-tolerant higher dimensional QKD
scheme, one naturally asks if it is possible to find a unitary
operator T that cyclically permutes as many types of single
quantum register errors as possible by conjugation. In this
subsection, I am going to show that such an operator T indeed
exists by explicitly writing down an expression for T . But
before doing so, I need to introduce a few notations.
Definition 2 (Ashikhmin and Knill [25]): Suppose a ∈
GF (N) where N = pn with p being a prime. We define
the unitary operators Xa and Za acting on an N -dimensional
Hilbert space by
Xa|b〉 = |a+ b〉 (1)
and
Za|b〉 = χa(b)|b〉 ≡ ωTr(ab)p |b〉, (2)
where χa is an additive character of the finite field GF (N),
ωp is a primitive pth root of unity and Tr(a) = a+ap+ap
2
+
· · · + apn−1 is the absolute trace of a ∈ GF (N). Note that,
the arithmetic inside the state ket and in the exponent of ωp
is performed in the finite field GF (N).
It is easy to see from Definition 2 that {XaZb : a, b ∈
GF (N)} spans the set of all possible linear operators for an
N -dimensional quantum register over C. Besides, Xa and Zb
follow the algebra
XaXb = XbXa = Xa+b, (3)
ZaZb = ZbZa = Za+b (4)
and
ZbXa = ω
Tr(ab)
p XaZb (5)
for all a, b ∈ GF (N), where arithmetic in the subscripts is
performed in GF (N).
Let T be a linear operator acting on an N -dimensional space
where N = pn is a prime power. Inspired by the permuting
property of the unitary operator used by Lo in the security
proof of the six-state scheme [21], one naturally demands that
T−1XaZbT = ω
f(a,b)
p Xa′(a,b)Zb′(a,b) for all a, b ∈ GF (N).
The factor ωf(a,b)p ∈ C satisfying |ωf(a,b)p | = 1 is sometimes
known as the global phase because it simply multiplies a
quantum state by a phase independent of that state. In order
for T to cyclically permute as many XaZb’s as possible, one
may demand that[
a′
b′
]
=
[
α β
β γ
] [
a
b
]
≡M(T )
[
a
b
]
, (6)
for all a, b ∈ GF (N), where α, β and γ ∈ GF (N). I shall
simply denote M(T ) by M in this paper when the map T is
clearly known to readers.
The phase factor ωf(a,b)p and the matrix M(T ) cannot
be arbitrarily chosen. To show this, I use Eqs. (3)–(6) to
manipulate the expression Xa+cZb+dT . On the one hand,
it equals ωf(a+c,b+d)p TX(a+c)α+(b+d)βZ(a+c)β+(b+d)γ.
On the other hand, it equals ω−Tr(bc)p XaZbXcZdT
= ω
f(c,d)−Tr(bc)
p XaZbTXcα+dβZcβ+dγ = ω
f(a,b)+f(c,d)
p
ω
Tr([aβ+bγ][cα+dβ]−bc)
p TX(a+c)α+(b+d)βZ(a+c)β+(b+d)γ.
Therefore, T is well-defined if and only if the phases in
the above two ways of expressing Xa+cZb+dT agree for all
a, b, c, d ∈ GF (N).
It is tedious but straight-forward to check that the following
three constraints (Eqs. (7)–(9)) plus the three phase conven-
tions (Eqs. (10)–(12)) make the expressions in the above
paragraph consistent and hence the linear map T well-defined:
αγ − β2 = 1, (7)
XaZbT = ω
f(a,b)
p TXaα+bβZaβ+bγ (8)
and
f(a, b) =
1
2
Tr(β[a2α+ b2γ]) + Tr(abβ2 +
δp2β
∑
i>j
gigj [aiajα+ bibjγ]) (9)
for all a, b ∈ GF (N). Note that in Eq. (9), a = ∑ni=1 aigi
and b =
∑n
i=1 bigi where {g1, g2, . . . , gn} is a fixed basis of
GF (N) over the field GF (p) and ai, bi ∈ GF (p). Moreover,
δp2 in the above equation is the Kronecker delta.
Two important remarks are in place. First, when p > 2
and hence N is odd, 2 is invertible in GF (N). Consequently,
global phase ωf(a,b)p may be chosen from pth roots of unity.
Following this convention, I demand
f(a, b) ∈ Z/pZ for any a, b ∈ GF (N) if 2 6 |N. (10)
In contrast, when p = 2 and hence N is even, 2 is not
invertible in GF (N). In this case f(a, b) may be integral or
4half-integral. Consequently, ωf(a,b)p ∈ {±1,±i}. In this case,
I use the convention that
ω
Tr(αβa2jg
2
j )/2
2 =
{
1 if Tr(αβa2jg2j ) = 0,
i if Tr(αβa2jg2j ) = 1,
(11)
and
ω
Tr(βγb2jg
2
j )/2
2 =
{
1 if Tr(βγb2jg2j ) = 0,
i if Tr(βγb2jg2j ) = 1,
(12)
for all aj , bj ∈ GF (p), where j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The second remark concerns the reason why we have the
last term in Eq. (9). Recall that the identity Tr(a2i + a2j)/2 +
Tr(aiaj) = Tr([ai+aj]2)/2 holds only for p > 2. In contrast,
Tr(a2i + a2j) = Tr([ai + aj ]2) for p = 2. So, I cannot use the
first identity to absorb the last term in Eq. (9) into the first
term when p = 2.
Lemma 1: A linear operator T obeying Eqs. (7)–(12) is
unitary after a proper scaling. Specifically, T is unitary if and
only if its operator norm satisfies ‖T ‖ = 1.
Proof: I only need to show that ‖T ‖ = 1 is a sufficient
condition as this condition is clearly necessary. Eqs. (7)–
(12) lead to XaZbTT † = ωf(a,b)p TXaα+bβZaβ+bγT † =
ω
f(a,b)−Tr([aα+bβ][aβ+bγ])
p TZ
†
−aβ−bγX
†
−aα−bβT
† =
ω
f(a,b)+f(−a,−b)−Tr(β[a2α+b2γ])−2Tr(abβ2)
p TT †XaZb =
TT †XaZb for all a, b ∈ GF (N). By the same argument,
XaZbT
†T = T †TXaZb for all a, b ∈ GF (N). Since
T acts on a finite dimensional Hilbert space and
{XaZb : a, b ∈ GF (N)} spans the set of all linear
operators on that Hilbert space, TT † and T †T are constant
multiples of the identity operator. Therefore, ‖T ‖ = 1 implies
TT † = I = T †T . Hence, T is unitary.
In order to fully utilize the error tolerance capability of
an N -dimensional QKD scheme, T should satisfy one more
constraint, namely, the order of T must be as large as possible.
The theorem below gives us an attainable upper bound for the
order of T .
Theorem 1: There exists a unitary operator T satisfying
the constraints Eqs. (7)–(9), the phase conventions stated in
Eqs. (10)–(12) as well as the condition that I, T, T 2, . . . , TN
are distinct operators up to a global phase. (That is, for all
0 ≤ i < j ≤ N and θ ∈ R, T i 6= eiθT j .) Furthermore, the
order of T up to a global phase satisfying Eqs. (7)–(12) is at
most (N +1). Suppose further that {g1, g2, . . . , gn} is a fixed
basis of GF (N) over GF (p), then T is given by
T =
eiθ
N
∑
a,b∈GF (N)
ω
Tr(ϕ1(a,b))− 12 Tr(ϕ2(a,b))
p XaZb (13)
for some θ ∈ R, where
ϕ1(a, b)
=
1
(2− α− γ)2 {β
3(γ − 1)a2 − (γ − 1)[(α− 1)2 +
β2(2α− 1)]ab+ β[αγ(α − 1) + γ − 1]b2}+
δp2β
∑
i>j
gigj(a˜ia˜jα+ b˜ib˜jγ) (14)
and
ϕ2(a, b)
=
β
(2− α− γ)2 [(α+ γ − 2αγ)(a
2 + 2βab+ b2) +
2β2(γa2 + αb2)]. (15)
Note that all the arithmetic in the above two equations are
performed in the finite field GF (N). Besides, in Eq. (14),
a˜i, b˜i ∈ GF (p) are the unique solutions of the equations
n∑
i=1
a˜igi =
(γ − 1)a− βb
2− α− γ (16)
and
n∑
i=1
b˜igi =
(α− 1)b− βa
2− α− γ . (17)
Proof: From Eqs. (6) and (8), I know that the order of
T up to a global phase is equal to the order of M ≡ M(T ).
Combining with Eq. (7), the characteristic equation of M is
Char(M) = λ2 − (α + γ)λ + 1. If Char(M) is reducible in
GF (N), the order of M and hence also the order of T up to
a global phase are at most (N − 1). So, to construct T with
a larger order, I must look for Char(M) that is irreducible
in GF (N). Nevertheless, a degree two irreducible polynomial
over GF (N) splits in GF (N2). Since the constant term of
Char(M) is 1, the roots of Char(M) = 0 over GF (N2) can
be written as ξ and ξ−1 respectively. Since α+γ ∈ GF (N), I
conclude that ξ+ ξ−1 = (ξ+ ξ−1)N = ξN + ξ−N . Therefore,
(ξN+1 − 1)(ξN−1 − 1) = 0. However, ξ 6∈ GF (N) and
hence ξN+1 = 1. In other words, the order of the irreducible
polynomial Char(M) and hence the order of T up to a global
phase both divide (N + 1). More importantly, since N 6≡
1 mod (N + 1) and N2 ≡ 1 mod (N + 1), Theorem 3.5 in
Ref. [26] assures the existence of an order (N+1) irreducible
polynomial in the form λ2 + cλ+ 1 over GF (N). (Actually,
Theorem 3.5 in Ref. [26] implies that λ2+cλ+1 is irreducible
over GF (N) if and only if it is equal to (λ + ξ)(λ + ξ−1)
for ξ ∈ GF (N2)\GF (N) with ξN+1 = 1. Hence, such
irreducible polynomials can be found efficiently.)
It remains to show that there exists T whose order of the
corresponding characteristic polynomial Char(M(T )) equals
(N + 1). I divide the proof into two cases.
Case 1: p = 2 or p ≡ 1 mod 4 where N = pn. In this
case, I simply pick α = 0, γ = −c and β = (−1)1/2. (Such a
β ∈ GF (N) exists because x2 ≡ −1 mod p is solvable when
p = 2 or p is a prime satisfying p ≡ 1 mod 4.) Then, it is
easy to check that Eq. (7) is satisfied and hence T exists.
Case 2: p > 2. In this case, I pick α = 1, γ = −c − 1. In
this way, β2 = −c− 2 = ξ+ ξ−1− 2 = −(ξ− 1)(ξ−1− 1) =
(ξ − 1)2ξ−1. Hence, I choose β = (ξ − 1)ξ−1/2 = ξ1/2 −
ξ−1/2. (ξ1/2 exists since p is an odd prime and ξN+1 = 1 so
that ξ = κN−1 where κ is a primitive element in GF (N2).
Moreover, β ∈ GF (N) since (ξ1/2 − ξ−1/2)N = ξN/2 −
ξ−N/2 = −ξ−1/2 + ξ1/2.)
Now, I am ready to explicitly construct T . To do so, I write
T =
∑
a,b∈GF (N)ΛabXaZb for some Λab ∈ C. From Eq. (8),
5N M(T ) T
2
[
0 1
1 1
]
1
2
(I − iX1 − iZ1 +X1Z1)
3
[
1 1
1 2
]
1
3
2∑
i,j=0
ω
2δi0+δj0
3 XiZj
4
[
0 1
1 ω
]
1
4
∑
i,j∈GF (4)
(−1)−Tr(ω[i+j])/2+Tr(i+j)+δi+j−1XiZj
TABLE I
THE CHOICES OF T AND M(T ) FOR N = 2, 3 AND 4. NOTE THAT
ω ∈ GF (4) SATISFIES ω2 + ω + 1 = 0 AND I HAVE USED {1, ω} AS THE
BASIS OF GF (4) OVER GF (2) WHEN CONSTRUCTING T FOR N = 4.
I conclude that
Λij = ω
f(a,b)+Tr([aα+bβ]{j−aβ−b[γ−1]}−bi)
p ×
Λi−a(α−1)−bβ,j−aβ−b(γ−1) (18)
for all a, b, i, j ∈ GF (N). Since the order of T is greater
than 1, M(T )−I =
[
α− 1 β
β γ − 1
]
is invertible. Hence, I
can choose suitable a = a(i, j) and b = b(i, j) in Eq. (18) to
relate every Λij to Λ00. In this way, I conclude that every
Λij is proportional to Λ00. Besides, all |Λij |’s are equal.
Consequently, the unitarity of T implies that |Λ00| = 1/N .
By explicitly substituting a, b into Eq. (18) and after a tedious
but straight-forward calculation, I arrive at Eqs. (13)–(17).
The explicit construction of the operator T in the above
proof also shows that once the 2 × 2 matrix M(T ) and the
primitive root ωp are fixed, T is uniquely determined up to a
global phase and a convention for ωf(a,b)p .
For illustration purpose, the choices of M(T )’s and hence
the unitary operators T ’s for N = 2, 3, 4 computed by
Eqs. (10)–(17) are tabulated in Table I. Incidentally, the unitary
operator T listed in Table I for N = 2 is, up to a global phase,
the same as the one used by Lo in his security proof of the
six-state scheme in Ref. [21].
Now, I report several important properties of T and M(T )
that will be used in the security proof of this QKD scheme in
Section IV.
Lemma 2: Suppose the order of M(T ) equals (N+1), then
M(T )k is in the form aI for some a ∈ GF (N) if and only
if (1) p = 2 and (N + 1)|k; or (2) p > 2 and [(N + 1)/2]|k.
In fact, if p > 2, M(T )(N+1)/2 = −I .
Proof: Since Char(M(T )) = λ2+ cλ+1, M(T ) can be
written in the form P−1DP where D = diag(ξ, ξ−1) where
ξ ∈ GF (N2) and ξN+1 = 1. Hence M(T )k = aI if and only
if ξ2k = 1. If p = 2, ξ2k = 1 ⇔ ξk = 1 ⇔ (N + 1)|k. And
if p > 2, ξ2k = 1 ⇔ ξk = ±1 ⇔ [(N + 1)/2]|k. Moreover,
ξk = −1 if and only if k = [(N + 1)/2] mod (N + 1).
Corollary 1: The period of the sequence {T−kXaZbT k :
k ∈ N} up to global phases equals (N + 1) whenever a, b ∈
GF (N) are not all zero. Furthermore, if p = 2, there is exactly
one 0 ≤ k ≤ N with T−kXaZbT k = ΛZc for some Λ ∈ C
and c ∈ GF (N). If p > 2, either T−kXaZbT k 6= ΛZc for all
k or there are two distinct 0 ≤ k, k′ ≤ N with T−kXaZbT k =
ΛZc and T−k
′
XaZbT
k′ = Λ′Zc′ for Λ,Λ′ ∈ C and c 6= c′ ∈
GF (N).
Proof: Direct application of Lemma 2.
Definition 3: T defines an equivalent relationship for
GF (N)2 by (a, b) ∼ (a′, b′) if there exists i ∈ N and
Λ ∈ C\{0} such that T−iXaZbT i = ΛXa′Zb′ . I denote
elements in the corresponding equivalent class by (a, b)/ ∼.
Corollary 2: There are N elements in the equivalent class
GF (N)2/ ∼. Besides, |(a, b)/ ∼ | = N +1 if (a, b) 6= (0, 0).
For every a ∈ GF (N), there exists at most two distinct b, b′ ∈
GF (N) such that (a, b) ∼ (a, b′). Furthermore, if p > 2,
b 6= b′ and c 6= 0, then (0, c) ∼ (a, b) ∼ (a, b′) ⇒ a = 0 if
and only if N = 3. If p = 2, (0, b) ∼ (0, b′) implies b = b′.
In addition, suppose that p = 2 and a 6= 0. Then, for any
b ∈ GF (N), there exists c = c(b) such that (0, a) ∼ (b, c). In
summary, GF (N)2/ ∼= {(0, a)/ ∼: a ∈ GF (N)} if p = 2.
On the other hand, if p > 2, there are (N − 1)/2 elements
of GF (N)2/ ∼ each containing two distinct elements in the
form (0, b).
Proof: By writing
M(T )
= P−1
[
ξ 0
0 ξ−1
]
P
≡
[
β ξ − α
β ξ−1 − α
]−1 [
ξ 0
0 ξ−1
] [
β ξ − α
β ξ−1 − α
]
,(19)
then (a, b) ∼ (a, b′) if and only if there exists k such that
[
ξk 0
0 ξ−k
]
P
[
a
b
]
= P
[
a
b′
]
. (20)
By eliminating k from the above equation, I obtain a quadratic
equation involving variables a, b and b′. Thus, for a given a, b,
there are at most two distinct b′ satisfying Eq. (20). Hence,
for every a ∈ GF (N), there are at most two distinct b, b′ ∈
GF (N) with (a, b) ∼ (a, b′).
Now suppose p > 2, b 6= b′ and c 6= 0. If (0, c) ∼ (a, b) ∼
(a, b′), there exist two distinct integers k, k′ ∈ [0, N ] such
that Mk[0 c]T = [a b]T and Mk′ [0 c]T = [a b′]T . Using
Eq. (19) to equate the first rows of the above two equations,
I obtain ξk − ξ−k = ξk′ − ξ−k′ . The solution of this equation
is ξk = ξk′ or ξk+k′ = −1. Since p > 2, Lemma 2 demands
that k = k′ mod (N +1) or k+ k′ = [(N +1)/2] mod (N +
1). As N is odd, there are at most two solutions for 2k =
[(N + 1)/2] mod (N + 1). Thus, provided that N > 3, there
exist more than two pairs of (k, k′) such that k 6= k′ and
k+ k′ = [(N +1)/2] mod (N +1). Hence, there exist b 6= b′
such that (0, c) ∼ (a, b) ∼ (a, b′) for a 6= 0. In contrast, if
N = 3, (0, 2) and (2, 0) are the only two pairs of (k, k′)
satisfying k 6= k′ and k + k′ = 2 mod 4. From Lemma 2,
M2 = −I when N = 3. Hence, (a, b, b′) equals (0, 1, 2) or
(0, 2, 1). Therefore, (0, c) ∼ (a, b) ∼ (a, b′)⇒ a = 0.
The remaining assertions then follow directly from Corol-
lary 1.
6B. An Entanglement-Based QKD Scheme
Let N be a prime power and T be the order (N+1) unitary
operator described in Theorem 1 in Subsection III-A. Then,
the QKD scheme goes as follows.
Entanglement-based QKD Scheme A
1) Alice prepares L≫ 1 quantum particle pairs in the state∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N . She applies one of the following
unitary transformation to the second particle in each
pair randomly and independently: I, T, T 2, . . . , TN . For
every pair of particles, Alice keeps the first one and
sends the second one to Bob. He acknowledges the
reception of these particles and then applies one of
the following to each received particle randomly and
independently: I−1, T−1, T−2, . . . , T−N . Now, Alice
and Bob publicly reveal their unitary transformations
applied to each particle. A shared pair is then kept and
is said to be in the set Si if Alice and Bob have applied
T i and T−i to the second particle of the shared pair
respectively. Thus in the absence of noise and Eve, each
pair of shared particles kept by Alice and Bob should
be in the state
∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N .
2) Alice and Bob estimate the (quantum) channel error
rate by sacrificing a few particle pairs. Specifically, they
randomly pick O([N +1]2 log{[N +1]/ǫ}/δ2N2) pairs
from each of the (N + 1) sets Si and measure each
particle of the pair in the {|0〉, |1〉, · · · , |N − 1〉} basis,
namely the standard basis. They publicly announce and
compare their measurement results. In this way, they
know the estimated channel error rate within standard
deviation δ with probability at least (1−ǫ). (Detail proof
of this claim can be found in Ref. [2]. A brief outline
of the proof will also be given in Subsection IV-B for
handy reference.) If the channel error rate is too high,
they abort the scheme and start all over again.
3) Alice and Bob perform the following privacy amplifi-
cation procedure. (Readers will find out in Section IV
that step 3a below reduces errors in the form XaZb with
a 6= 0 at the expense of increasing errors in the form Zc
with c 6= 0. In contrast, step 3b below reduces errors in
the form XaZb with b 6= 0 at the expense of increasing
errors in the form Xc with c 6= 0. Most vitally, applying
steps 3a and 3b in turn is an effective way to reduce all
kinds of errors.)
a) Alice and Bob apply the entanglement purifica-
tion procedure by two way classical communi-
cation (LOCC2 EP) similar to the ones reported
in Refs. [19], [27]. Specifically, Alice and Bob
randomly group their remaining quantum particles
in tetrads; and each tetrad consists of two pairs
shared between Alice and Bob in Step 1. Alice
randomly picks one of the two particles in her
share of each tetrad as the control register and
the other as the target. She applies the following
unitary operation to the control and target registers:
|i〉control ⊗ |j〉target 7−→ |i〉control ⊗ |j − i〉target, (21)
where the subtraction is performed in the finite
field GF (N). Bob applies the same unitary trans-
formation to his corresponding share of particles
in the tetrad. Then, they publicly announce their
measurement results of their target registers in
the standard basis. They keep their control regis-
ters only when the measurement results of their
corresponding target registers agree. They repeat
the above LOCC2 EP procedure until there is
an integer r > 0 such that a single application
of step 3b will bring the quantum channel error
rate of the resultant particles down to less than
ǫI/ℓ
2 for an arbitrary but fixed security parameter
ǫI > 0, where rℓ is the number of remaining pairs
they shared currently. They abort the scheme either
when r is greater than the number of remaining
quantum pairs they possess or when they have used
up all their quantum particles in this procedure.
b) They apply the majority vote phase error correction
(PEC) procedure introduced by Gottesman and Lo
[22]. Specifically, Alice and Bob randomly divide
the resultant particles into sets each containing r
pairs of particles shared between Alice and Bob.
Alice and Bob separately apply the [r, 1, r]N phase
error correction procedure to their corresponding
shares of r particles in each set and retain their
phase error corrected quantum particles. At this
point, Alice and Bob should share ℓ almost per-
fect pairs
∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N with fidelity at least
(1− ǫI/ℓ). By measuring their shared pairs in the
standard basis, Alice and Bob obtain their common
key. More importantly, Eve’s information on this
common key is less than the security parameter ǫI .
(Proof of this claim can be found in Theorem 4 in
Subsection IV-C below.)
Note that when N = 2, Scheme A is a variation of
the six-state scheme introduced by Chau in Ref. [23]. The
key difference is that the present one does not make use of
Calderbank-Shor-Steane quantum code after PEC while the
former one does.
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE ENTANGLEMENT-BASED
QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
In this section, I am going to report a detail unconditional
security proof of Scheme A in the limit of large number of
quantum particle L transmitted. I will also investigate the
maximum error tolerance rate for Scheme A against the most
general type of eavesdropping attack allowed by the laws
of quantum physics. With suitable modifications, the security
proof reported here can be extended to the case of a small
finite L. Nevertheless, working in the limit of large L makes
the asymptotic error tolerance rate analysis easier.
Before carrying out the cryptanalysis, I will first define
various error rate measures and discuss how to fairly compare
error tolerance capabilities between different QKD schemes
in Subsection IV-A. Then, I will briefly explain why a re-
liable upper bound of the channel error can be obtained by
7randomly testing only a small subset of quantum particles
in step 2 of Scheme A in Subsection IV-B. Finally, I will
prove the security of the privacy amplification procedure in
step 3 of Scheme A and analyze its error tolerance rate in
Subsection IV-C. This will complete the proof of unconditional
security for entanglement-based Scheme A.
A. Fair Comparison Of Error Tolerance Capability And Var-
ious Measures Of Error Rates
Definition 4: Recall that Alice prepares L particle pairs
each in the state
∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N and randomly applies
powers of T to each pair. Denote the resultant (pure) state
of the pairs by
⊗L
j=1 |φj〉. Then, she sends one particle
in each pair through an insecure quantum channel to Bob;
and upon reception, Bob randomly applies powers of T to
his share of the pair. The channel quantum error rate in
this situation is defined as the marginal error rate of the
measurement results when Alice and Bob were going to
make an hypothetical measurement on the jth shared quantum
particle pair in the basis {XaZb ⊗ I|φj〉 : a, b ∈ GF (N)} for
all j. In other words, the channel quantum error rate equals
1/L times the expectation value of the cardinality of the set
{j : hypothetical measurement of the jth pair equals XaZb⊗
I|φj〉 with (a, b) 6= (0, 0)}. The channel standard ba-
sis measurement error rate is defined as 1/L times
the expectation value of the cardinality of the set
{j : hypothetical measurement of the jth pair equals XaZb⊗
I|φj〉 with a 6= 0}. The next two definitions concern only
those quantum particle pairs retained by Alice and Bob in⋃
i Si. (That is, those Alice and Bob have applied T j and
T−j to the second particle of the shared pair for some j re-
spectively.) In the absence of noise and eavesdropper, all such
particle pairs should be in the state
∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N . The
signal quantum error rate (or quantum error rate (QER) for
short) in this situation is defined as the expectation value of the
proportion of particle pairs in
⋃
i Si whose measurement result
in the basis {∑i∈GF (N) |i〉 ⊗XaZb|i〉/√N : a, b ∈ GF (N)}
equals
∑
i∈GF (N) |i〉⊗XaZb|i〉/
√
N for some (a, b) 6= (0, 0).
The signal standard basis measurement error rate (or
standard basis measurement error rate (SBMER) for short)
is defined as the expectation value of the proportion of
particle pairs in
⋃
i Si whose measurement result in the basis
{∑i∈GF (N) |i〉 ⊗ XaZb|i〉/√N : a, b ∈ GF (N)} equals∑
i∈GF (N) |i〉⊗XaZb|i〉/
√
N for some a 6= 0. In other words,
SBMER measures the apparent error rate of the signal when
Alice and Bob measure their shares of particles in the standard
basis. In the special case of N = 2n, any standard basis
measurement result can be bijectively mapped to a n-bit string.
Thus, it makes sense to define the signal bit error rate (or
bit error rate (BER) for short) as the marginal error rate of
resultant n-bit string upon standard basis measurement of the
signal at the end of the signal preparation and transmission
stage.
Three important remarks are in place. First, SBMERs and
BERs for QKD schemes using quantum particles of different
dimensions as information carriers should never be com-
pared directly. This is because the quantum communication
channels used are different. In addition, the same eavesdrop-
ping strategy may lead to different error rates [13], [14],
[15], [16], [17]. It appears that the only sensible situation
to meaningfully compare the error tolerance capabilities of
two QKD schemes is when the schemes are using the same
quantum communication channel and are subjected to the
same eavesdropping attack. Specifically, suppose Alice re-
versibly maps every pn-dimensional quantum state used in
Scheme A into n possibly entangled p-dimensional quantum
particles and sends them through an insecure p-dimensional
quantum particle communication channel to Bob. Moreover,
since we assume that Alice and Bob do not have quantum
storage capability, it is reasonable to regard Alice to send
every packet of n possibly entangled p-dimensional quantum
particles consecutively. In this way, Scheme A becomes an
entangled-particle-based QKD scheme. More importantly, Eve
may apply the same eavesdropping attack on the insecure p-
dimensional quantum particle channel used by Alice and Bob
irrespective of n. In this way, I can fairly compare the er-
ror tolerance capability between two entangled-particle-based
QKD schemes derived from Scheme A using pn- and pn′-
dimensional particles respectively against any eavesdropping
attack on the p-dimensional quantum particle channel.
Second, the BER defined above for N = 2n with n > 1
depends on the bijection used. Fortunately, a useful lower
bound on the BER can be found amongst all bijections
immediately before Eq. (46) in Subsection IV-C.
Third, since quantum errors in the form XaZb with (a, b) 6=
(0, 0) permute under the conjugation by powers of T , the
channel quantum error rate is equal to the QER of the signal.
Roughly speaking, QER refers to the rate of any quantum
error (phase shift and/or spin flip) occurring in the pair∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N shared by Alice and Bob. In contrast,
due to the permutation of quantum errors by powers of T ,
the channel standard basis measurement error rate does not
equal to the SBMER in general.
B. Reliability On The Error Rate Estimation
In Scheme A, Alice and Bob keep only those particle pairs
that are believed to be in the state
∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N at
the end of step 1. Then, they measure some of them in the
standard basis in the signal quality control test in step 2.
More importantly, since all the LOCC2 EP and PEC privacy
amplification procedures in step 3 map standard basis to
standard basis, we can imagine conceptually that the final
standard basis measurements of their shared secret key were
performed right at the beginning of step 3. In this way, any
quantum eavesdropping strategy used by Eve is reduced to a
classical probabilistic cheating strategy [3].
Further recall that in step 2, Alice and Bob do not care about
the measurement outcome of an individual quantum register;
they only care about the difference between the measurement
outcome of Alice and the corresponding outcome of Bob. In
8other words, they apply the projection operators
Pa =
∑
i∈GF (N)
|i, i+ a〉 〈i, i+ a| (22)
to the randomly selected quantum registers they share in
the set S0. These projection operators can be rewritten in
a form involving Bell-like states as follows. Define |Φab〉
to be the Bell-like state
∑
i∈GF (N) |i〉 ⊗ XaZb|i〉/
√
N ≡∑
i∈GF (N) ω
Tr(ib)
p |i, i+ a〉/
√
N . Then the projection operator
Pa can also be written as
Pa =
∑
i∈GF (N)
|Φai〉 〈Φai|. (23)
In a similar way, Alice and Bob apply the projection operators
T−iPaT
i to the set Si for all i. Now, it is straight-forward
to check that the unitary operator T maps Bell-like states to
Bell-like states. Combining with Eqs. (22) and (23), the signal
quality control test in step 2 of Scheme A can be regarded as
an effective random sampling test for the fidelity of the pairs
as |Φ00〉 ≡
∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N .
At this point, classical sampling theory can be used to esti-
mate the quantum channel error and hence the eavesdropping
rate of the classical probabilistic cheating strategy used by Eve
as well as the fidelity of the remaining pairs as |Φ00〉.
Lemma 3 (Adapted from Lo, Chau and Ardehali [2]):
Suppose that immediately after step 1 in Scheme A,
Alice and Bob share Li pairs of particles in the set Si,
namely, those particles that are evolved under T i and then
T−i. Suppose further that Alice and Bob randomly pick
O(log[1/ǫ]/δ2) . 0.01Li out of the Li pairs for testing
in step 2. Define the estimated channel standard basis
measurement error rate eˆi to be the portion of tested pairs
whose measurement results obtained by Alice and Bob differ.
Denote the channel standard basis measurement error rate for
the set Si by ei. Then, the probability that |ei − eˆi| > δ is of
the order of ǫ for any fixed δ > 0.
Proof: Using earlier discussions in this subsection, the
problem depicted in this lemma is equivalent to a classical
random sampling problem without replacement whose solution
follows directly from Lemma 1 in Ref. [2].
Lemma 3 assures that by randomly choosing O(log[1/ǫ]/δ2)
out of Li pairs to test, the unbiased estimator eˆi cannot differ
from the actual channel standard basis measurement error rate
ei significantly. More importantly, the number of particle pairs
they need to test is independent of Li. Therefore, in the limit
of large Li (and hence large L), randomly testing a negligibly
small portion of quantum particle pairs is sufficient for Alice
and Bob to estimate with high confidence the channel standard
basis measurement error rate in the set Si [2]. In addition, the
QER of the remaining untested particle pairs is the same as
that of
⋃N
i=0 Si in the large L limit.
Theorem 2: Using the notation in Lemma 3,
∑N
i=0 eˆi/N is
a reliable estimator of the upper bound of the QER. Specifi-
cally, the probability that the QER exceeds∑Ni=0 eˆi/N+(N+
1)δ/N is less than ǫ(N + 1).
Proof: Recall that Eve does not know the choice of
unitary operators applied by Alice and Bob in step 1 in
Scheme A. Hence, in the limit of large L, the XaZb error
rate in the set S0 is equal to that of T−kXaZbT k in the set
Sk. Therefore, this theorem follows directly from Corollary 1
and Lemma 3.
To summarize, once the signal quality control test in step 2
of Scheme A is passed, Alice and Bob have high confidence
(of at least (1 − ǫ)) that the QER of the remaining untested
particle pairs is small.
Before leaving this subsection, I would like to point out
that one can estimate the QER in a more aggressive way.
Specifically, Alice and Bob do not simply know whether the
measurement results of each tested pair are equal, in fact
they know the difference between their measurement results
in each tested pair. They may exploit this extra piece of
information to better estimate the probability of XaZb error
in the signal for each a, b ∈ GF (N). Such estimation helps
them to devise tailor-made privacy amplification schemes that
tackle the specific kind of error caused by channel noise and
Eve. While this methodology will be useful in practical QKD,
I shall not pursue this direction further here as the aim of
this paper is the worst-case cryptanalysis in the limit of large
number of quantum particle transfer L.
C. Security Of Privacy Amplification
Definition 5: We denote the XaZb error rate of the quantum
particles shared by Alice and Bob just before step 3 in
Scheme A by ea,b. And when there is no possible confusion in
the subscript, we shall write eab instead of ea,b. Similarly, we
denote the XaZb error rate of the resultant quantum particles
shared by them after k rounds of LOCC2 EP by ek EPa,b or ek EPab .
Suppose further that Alice and Bob perform PEC using the
[r, 1, r]N majority vote code after k rounds of LOCC2 EP.
We denote the resultant XaZb error rate by ePECa,b or ePECab .
Recall that Alice and Bob randomly and independently
apply T i and T−j to each transmitted quantum register.
More importantly, their choices are unknown to Eve when
the quantum particle is traveling in the insecure channel.
Let E be the quantum operation that Eve applies to the
quantum particles in the set
⋃N
i=0 Si. (In other words, E is
a completely positive convex-linear map acting on the set of
density matrices describing the quantum particle pairs to which
Alice and Bob has applied T j and T−j respectively for some
j. Moreover, the trace of E is between 0 and 1.) After Alice
and Bob have publicly announced their choices of quantum
operations, the quantum particle pairs in
⋃N
i=0 Si had equal
chance of suffering from (⊗jT−ij )E(⊗jT ij ) where 0 ≤ ij ≤
N . Note that the index j in the tensor product in the above
expression runs over all particles pairs in
⋃N
i=0 Si. Besides,
the privacy amplification procedure in step 3 is performed
irrespective to which set Si the particle belong to. Therefore,
the QER satisfies the constraints∑
i,j∈GF (N)
eij = 1 (24)
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eab = ea′b′ if (a, b) ∼ (a′, b′). (25)
After knowing the initial conditions for the QER, I am going
to investigate the effect of LOCC2 EP on the QER.
Lemma 4: In the limit of a large number of transmitted
quantum registers, ek EPab is given by
ek EPab =
∑
c0,...,c2k−2
eac0eac1 · · · eac2k−2ea,b−c0−c1−···−c2k−2∑
i∈GF (N)
(∑
j∈GF (N) eij
)2k .
(26)
Moreover, in this limit, ek EPab = ek EP−a,−b for all a, b ∈ GF (N)
and k ∈ N.
Proof: Suppose the control and target registers in Bob’s
laboratory suffer from XaZb and Xa′Zb′ errors respectively.
(In contrast, those in Alice’s hand are error-free as they never
pass through the insecure noisy channel.) Then after applying
the unitary operation in Eq. (21), the errors in the control
and target registers will become XaZb+b′ and Xa′−aZb′
respectively.
In the limit of large number of transmitted quantum regis-
ters, the covariance between probabilities of picking any two
distinct quantum register tends to zero. Besides, the covariance
between probabilities of picking any two distinct pairs of
quantum registers also tends to zero. Hence, in this limit, the
expectation value of the XaZb error rate just after applying the
unitary operation in Eq. (21) can be computed by assuming
that the error in every control and target register pair is
independent. Moreover, the variance of the XaZb error rate
tends to zero in this limit.
To show that Eq. (26) is valid, let us recall that Alice and
Bob keep their control registers only when the measurement
results of their corresponding target registers agree. In other
words, they keep the control registers only when a = a′. Thus,
once the control register in Bob’s laboratory is kept, it will suf-
fer an error XdZc where d = a and c = b+b′. Therefore, in the
limit of a large number of transmitted quantum registers, the
number of quantum registers remains after (k + 1) rounds of
LOCC2 EP is proportional to
∑
i∈GF (N)(
∑
j∈GF (N) e
k EP
ij )
2
.
Similarly, the number of quantum registers suffering from
XaZb error after (k+1) rounds of LOCC2 EP is proportional
to
∑
c∈GF (N) e
k EP
ac e
k EP
a,b−c. More importantly, the two propor-
tionality constants are the same. Therefore,
e
(k+1) EP
ab =
∑
c∈GF (N) e
k EP
ac e
k EP
a,b−c∑
i∈GF (N)
(∑
j∈GF (N) e
k EP
ij
)2 (27)
for all k ∈ N. Eq. (26) can then be proven by mathematical
induction on k. (It is easier to use mathematical induction to
prove the validity of the numerator in Eq. (26) and then use
Eq. (24) to determine the denominator.)
To show that ek EPab = ek EP−a,−b, I only consider the
case of p > 2 since the assertion is trivially true when
p = 2. From Corollary 2 and Eq. (25), we have eab =
e−a,−b. Inductively, assuming the validity of the asser-
tion for k, then e(k+1) EPab =
∑
c∈GN(N) e
k EP
ac e
k EP
a,b−c/Dk =∑
c∈GF (N) e
k EP
−a,−ce
k EP
−a,−b+c/Dk = e
(k+1) EP
−a,−b , where Dk =
∑
i∈GF (N)(
∑
j∈GF (N) e
k EP
ij )
2
. Hence, the lemma is proved.
Eq. (26) in Lemma 4 can be expressed in a more compact
and useful form below.
Corollary 3: Any element a ∈ GF (N) ≡ GF (pn) can be
expressed as a degree (n − 1) polynomial a0 + a1x + · · · +
an−1x
n−1 in GF (p)[x]. With this notation in mind, ek EPab in
Eq. (26) can be rewritten as
ek EPab =


p−1∑
m0,...,mn−1=0
cos
(
2π
∑n−1
i=0 mibi
p
)
×

 ∑
j∈GF (N)
eaj cos
(
2π
∑n−1
i=0 miji
p
)
2k

×

N ∑
i∈GF (N)

 ∑
j∈GF (N)
eij


2k


−1
. (28)
In particular, if eab satisfies
eab =


1− e00
N + 1
if (a, b) ∼ (0, 1),
0 if (a, b) 6∼ (0, 0) and (0, 1),
(29)
then for p = 2,
ek EP00 =
(e00 + e01)
2k + (e00 − e01)2k
2[(e00 + e01)2
k +
∑
i6=0(
∑
j∈GF (N) eij)
2k ]
, (30)
ek EP01 =
(e00 + e01)
2k − (e00 − e01)2k
2[(e00 + e01)2
k +
∑
i6=0(
∑
j∈GF (N) eij)
2k ]
(31)
and
ek EP0b = 0 for b 6= 0, 1. (32)
Proof: The numerator of Eq. (26) is equal to the sum
of coefficients of the terms in the form xm00 x
m1
1 · · ·xmn−1n−1
in the polynomial (
∑
j∈GF (N) eajx
j0
0 x
j1
1 · · ·xjn−1n−1 )2
k
where mi = −bi mod p for all i. This sum is in
turn equal to
∑
x0,...,xm−1=1,ωp,...,ω
p−1
p
x−b00 · · ·x−bn−1n−1
(
∑
j∈GF (N) eajx
j0
0 · · ·xjn−1n−1 )2
k
/N . Since the imaginary part
of the above sum is zero, I arrive at the expression in Eq. (28).
The proof of the remaining parts of this lemma now follow
directly from Eq. (28) and Corollary 2.
Lemma 4 and Corollary 3 generalize a similar result for
qubits [22], [23]. In fact, the effect of LOCC2 EP is to reduce
errors in the form XaZb with a 6= 0 at the expense of possibly
increasing errors in the form Zc with c 6= 0. I further remark
that in case L is finite, ek EPab is determined by solving the
classical problem of randomly pairing N2 kinds of balls in an
urn containing 2rℓ balls. Therefore, ek EPab is related to the so-
called multivariate hypergeometric distribution whose theory
is reviewed extensively in Ref. [28].
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In the qubit case, that is when N = p = 2, Eqs. (24)
and (25) demand that e01 = e10 = e11 = (1 − e00)/3. In
other words, the evolution of QER under the action of LOCC2
EP depends on a single parameter, namely, e00. Nevertheless,
the situation is more complicated when N > 2 because ek EPab
depends on more than one parameter. Fortunately, as we shall
see later on, it is possible to determine the worst case scenario
for eab when the number of rounds of LOCC2 EP, k, is
sufficiently large when p = 2.
Lemma 5: The following two statements hold provided that
either (1) p = 2 and e00 > 1/(N + 2) or (2) p > 2 and
e00 > 2/(N + 3).
(a) The maximum term in the denominator of Eq. (28) is
(
∑
j∈GF (N) e0j)
2k
.
(b) ek EP00 > ek EP0b whenever b 6= 0.
Proof: To prove the first statement, I first consider the
p = 2 case. Using Corollary 2 plus the two constraints in
Eqs. (24) and (25), we have e00 > (1 − e00)/(N + 1) =∑
j 6=0 e0j ≥ eab for all (a, b) 6= (0, 0). Hence, Corollary 2
demands that
∑
j(e0j − eij) ≥ e00 −
∑
j 6=0 e0j > 0 for all
i 6= 0. By the same argument, in the p > 2 case, ∑j(e0j −
eij) ≥ e00 − 2(1− e00)/(N + 1) > 0 for all i 6= 0.
To prove the second statement, I express ek EP00 − ek EP0b in
terms of e(k−1) EPij by invoking Eq. (27). The denominator of
this expression is positive and the numerator is given by
∑
c∈GF (N)
e
(k−1) EP
0c
[
e
(k−1) EP
0,−c − e(k−1) EP0,b−c
]
=
∑
c∈GF (N)
e
(k−1) EP
0c
[
e
(k−1) EP
0c − e(k−1) EP0,b−c
]
=
1
2
∑
c∈GF (N)
[
e
(k−1) EP
0c − e(k−1) EP0,b−c
]2
, (33)
where I have used Lemma 4 to arrive at the second line.
Therefore, ek EP00 ≥ ek EP0b for all b. In fact, our assumption
on the value of e00 implies e00 > e0b for all b 6= 0. Hence
from Eq. (33), statement (b) holds for k = 1. The validity
of statement (b) for all k ∈ Z+ can then be shown by
mathematical induction on k.
Theorem 3: In the limit of large number of quantum particle
transmitted from Alice to Bob, the XaZb error rate after PEC
ePECab using [r, 1, r]N majority vote code satisfies∑
i6=0
∑
j∈GF (N)
ePECij ≤ r
∑
i6=0
∑
j∈GF (N)
ek EPij . (34)
Moreover, if p = 2 and e00 > 1/(N + 2), then∑
i∈GF (N)
∑
j 6=0
ePECij
≤ (N − 1)
[
1− (e00 −
1−e00
N+1 )
2k+1
2(e00 +
1−e00
N+1 )
2k+1
]r
(35)
as k →∞.
Proof: Recall that the error syndrome of the [r, 1, r]N
majority vote code is


1 −1
1 −1
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 −1

 . (36)
Therefore, after measuring the (phase) error syndrome, Zb
error stays on the control register while Xa error propagates
from the control as well as all target registers to the resultant
control quantum register [29]. Specifically, suppose the error
on the ith quantum register is XaiZbi for i = 1, 2, . . . , r.
Then, after measuring the error syndrome, the resultant error
in the remaining control register equals Xa1+···+arZb1 . Con-
sequently, upon PEC, the error in the remaining register is
Xa1+···+arZb where b is the majority of bi (i = 1, 2, . . . , r).
In other words, after PEC, spin flip error rates are increased
by at most r times. Hence, Eq. (34) holds.
By the same argument used in Lemma 4, in the limit of large
number of quantum register transfer, the rate of any kind of
phase error after PEC,
∑
i∈GF (N)
∑
j 6=0 e
PEC
ij , satisfies
∑
i∈GF (N)
∑
j 6=0
ePECij
≤ (N − 1)max{Pr (the number of registers suffering
from error in the form XaZ1 is greater than or
equal to those suffering from error in the form Xa
when drawn from a random sample of r registers,
given a fixed e00)}, (37)
where the maximum is taken over all possible probabilities
with different eab’s satisfying the constraints in Eqs. (24)
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and (25). I denote the sum ∑i∈GF (N) ek EPib by ek EPZb . Then,∑
i∈GF (N)
∑
j 6=0
ePECij
≤ (N − 1)max{
r∑
s=0
(
r
s
)
(1− ek EPZ0 − ek EPZ1 )r−s ×
(ek EPZ0 + e
k EP
Z1 )
s Pr(the number of registers suffering
from error in the form XaZ1 is greater than or
equals to those suffering from error in the from Xa
when drawn from a random sample of s registers,
given that these s registers are suffering from error
in the form XaZb for b = 0, 1 and given a fixed e00)}
≤ (N − 1)max{
r∑
s=0
(
r
s
)
(1− ek EPZ0 − ek EPZ1 )r−s ×
(ek EPZ0 + e
k EP
Z1 )
s exp

−2s
(
1
2
− e
k EP
Z1
ek EPZ0 + e
k EP
Z1
)2}
= (N − 1)max{{1− (ek EPZ0 + ek EPZ1 )×[
e−2[1/2−e
k EP
Z1
/(ek EPZ0 +e
k EP
Z1
)]2 − 1
]}r
}
≤ (N − 1)max{[1− 2t(ek EPZ0 + ek EPZ1 )×(
1
2
− e
k EP
Z1
ek EPZ0 + e
k EP
Z1
)2
r
} (38)
where t→ 1 as k →∞. Note that I have used Eq. (1.2.5) in
Ref. [30] to arrive at the second inequality above. (Eq. (1.2.5)
is applicable because Lemma 5 implies that ek EPZ0 > e
k EP
Z1
for
a sufficiently large k.)
Since e00 satisfies p = 2 and e00 > 1/(N + 2), Lemma 5
tells us that (
∑
j∈GF (N) e0j)
2k is the dominant term in the
denominator of Eq. (28) when k is sufficiently large. Thus,
using Eq. (28), it is easy to check that both ek EPZ1 /ek EPZ0 and
ek EPZ0 + e
k EP
Z1
are maximized if eab = (1 − e00)/(N + 1)
for all (a, b) ∼ (0, 1) when subjected to the following two
constraints: (1) e00 is fixed; and (2) Eqs. (24) and (25) are
satisfied. Therefore, the last line of Eq. (38) is maximized if
Eq. (29) holds. Consequently, Eqs. (30) and (32) imply the
validity of Eq. (35).
The above theorem tells us that the effect of PEC is reducing
errors in the form XaZb with b 6= 0 at the expense of
possibly increasing errors in the form Xc with c 6= 0. For this
reason, powerful signal privacy amplification procedure can be
constructed by suitably combining LOCC2 EP and PEC.
Now, I am going to prove the unconditional security of
Scheme A.
Theorem 4: Let N = pn be a prime power, ǫp, ǫI and δ be
three arbitrarily small but fixed positive numbers. Define
eQER =
(N + 1)(
√
5− 2)
1 + (N + 1)(
√
5− 2) for p = 2. (39)
Then, the entanglement-based QKD Scheme A involving the
transfer of N -dimensional quantum particles is uncondition-
ally secure with security parameters (ǫp, ǫI) when the number
of quantum register transfer L ≡ L(ǫp, ǫI , δ) is sufficiently
large. Specifically, provided that Alice and Bob abort the
scheme whenever the estimated QER in step 2 is greater than
(eQER − δ), then the secret key generated by Alice and Bob
is provably secure in the L → ∞ limit. In fact, if Eve uses
an eavesdropping strategy with at least ǫp chance of passing
the signal quality test stage in step 2, the mutual information
between Eve’s measurement results after eavesdropping and
the final secret key is less than ǫI . In this respect, Scheme A
tolerates asymptotically up to eQER QER.
Proof: Since L ≫ (N + 1)4 log[(N + 1)/ǫp]/δ2N2,
therefore by applying Lemma 3 and Theorem 2, I conclude
that by testing O([N +1]2 log{[N +1]/ǫp}/δ2N2) pairs, any
eavesdropping strategy that causes a QER higher than eQER
has less than ǫp chance of passing the signal quality test stage
in step 2 of Scheme A. (Similarly, if the QER is less than
(eQER − 2δ), it has at least (1− ǫp) chance of passing step 2.
As δ can be chosen to be arbitrarily small, the signal quality
test stage in step 2 of Scheme A is not overly conservative.)
Now, suppose that Alice and Bob arrive at the signal privacy
amplification stage in step 3 of Scheme A. Since L→∞, the
quantum particle pairs used in the signal quality test stage
in step 2 do not affect the error rates eab’s of the remaining
untested particle pairs.
First, I consider the case when p = 2. After apply-
ing k rounds of LOCC2 EP, Alice and Bob may con-
sider picking r used in the majority vote PEC to be
ǫI/2
∑
i∈GF (N)
∑
j 6=0 e
k EP
ij . In the limit of k → ∞, Corol-
laries 2 and 3 imply that in the worst case scenario, there
are at most two distinct b = b(a) and b′ = b′(a) such that
eab, eab′ > 0 for all a 6= 0. Hence, r can be chosen to be
r ≈ ǫI [e00 + (1− e00)/(N + 1)]
2k
ℓN [2(1− e00)/(N + 1)]2k
(40)
whenever e00 > 1/(N+2), where ℓ is the number of quantum
particle pairs Alice and Bob share immediately after the PEC
procedure in step 3b. Besides, r → ∞ in the k → ∞ limit.
So, from Eqs. (34) and (35) in Theorem 3, the QER of the
remaining quantum registers after PEC, efinal is upper-bounded
by
efinal <
ǫI
2ℓ
+(N−1) exp
[
−ǫI(e00 − 1−e00N+1 )2
k+1
2ℓN(e00 +
1−e00
N+1 )
2k [ 2(1−e00)N+1 ]
2k
]
.
(41)
In other words, efinal < ǫI/ℓ provided that[
e00 − 1− e00
N + 1
]2
>
2(1− e00)
N + 1
[
e00 +
1− e00
N + 1
]
. (42)
This condition is satisfied if and only if
e00 >
1
1 + (N + 1)(
√
5− 2) . (43)
It is easy to verify that the constraint in Eq. (43) is consistent
with the assumption that e00 > 1/(N + 2). Hence, provided
that the initial QER satisfies∑
(i,j) 6=(0,0)
eij <
(N + 1)(
√
5− 2)
1 + (N + 1)(
√
5− 2) = e
QER, (44)
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N Tolerable SBMER Tolerable BER
2 27.64% 27.64%
4 43.31% 27.07%
8 60.44% 32.74%
16 75.34% 38.85%
TABLE II
THE TOLERABLE SBMER AND BER FOR SCHEME A AND HENCE ALSO
SCHEME B FOR 2n ≤ 16. AS POINTED OUT IN THE TEXT, THE VALUES OF
SBMER AND BER SHOULD NOT BE COMPARED DIRECTLY.
the fidelity of the ℓ quantum particle pairs shared between
Alice and Bob immediately before they perform standard basis
measurement to obtain their secret key is at least 1−efinal > 1−
ǫI/ℓ. By Footnote 28 in [3], the mutual information between
Eve’s final measurement result after eavesdropping and the
final secret key is at most ǫI . Thus, if Alice and Bob abort the
scheme if the estimated QER in step 2 exceeds (eQER − δ),
the secret key generated is provably secure. More importantly,
the scheme is unconditionally secure with security parameters
(ǫp, ǫI).
A few remarks are in order. First, the unconditional security
of Scheme A for p > 2 can be proven in a similar way.
However, the computation of eQER is getting messy as the
condition for minimizing eQER turns out to be N dependent.
Second, from Corollary 1, when p = 2, GF (N)/ ∼=
{(0, b)/ ∼: b ∈ GF (N)} and hence the ratio between QER
and SBMER for any kind of eavesdropping attacks equals
(N + 1) : N . In contrast, when p > 2, such a ratio varies
between (N + 1) : (N − 1) and 1 : 1. Combining these
observations with Theorem 4, I conclude that the maximum
tolerable SBMER for Scheme A is given by
eSBMER =


NeQER
N+1 if p = 2,
(N−1)eQER
N+1 if p > 2.
(45)
In addition, if p = 2, Corollary 2 implies that there is a
unique a 6= 0 such that (0, 1) ∼ (a, b) ∼ (a, b′) for some
b 6= b′. Hence, no matter which bijective map Alice and
Bob use to convert their standard basis measurement result of
an N -dimensional quantum particle into a log2N -bit string,
the ratio between QER and BER is at least (N + 1) : (1 +
0.5N log2N)/ log2N . Consequently, the maximum tolerable
BER for Scheme A is given by
eBER = eSBMER
(
1
2
+
1
N log2N
)
. (46)
I tabulate the tolerable SBMER and BER in Table II. However,
I must emphasize once again that according to the discussions
in Subsection IV-A, we should not and cannot deduce the
relative error tolerance capability from Table II.
Third, I study the tolerable error rate of Scheme A as a
function of N . Table II shows that the maximum tolerable
BER eBER for N = 2 is the same as the one obtained earlier
by Chau in Ref. [23]. More importantly, eSBMER increases as
n increases.
Actually, according to Eqs. (39) and Eqs. (45)–(46), the
tolerable SBMER and BER tend to 100% and 50% respec-
tively as 2n → ∞. More precisely, as n → ∞, the tolerable
BER for Scheme A using 2n-level quantum particles scales as
≈ 1/2− (3 +√5)/2n+1.
On the other hand, the lemma below set the upper limit for
the tolerable SBMER for Scheme A.
Lemma 6: The tolerable SBMER for Scheme A is upper-
bounded by (N −1)/(N+1) if p = 2 and (N −1)2/[N(N+
1)] if p > 2. In fact, these bounds are set by the following
interpret-and-resend strategy: Eve randomly and independently
measures each N -dimensional particle in the insecure quantum
channel in the standard basis {|0〉, |1〉, . . . , |N − 1〉}. Then,
she records the measurement result and resends the measured
particle to Bob.
Proof: The proof follows the idea reported in Ref. [22].
Clearly, using this intercept-and-resend strategy, no quantum
correlation between Alice and Bob can survive and hence no
provably secure key can be distributed. Thus, this eavesdrop-
ping strategy set the upper bound for the tolerable SMBER
and BER for Scheme A. It is easy to check that the bases
{T i|0〉, T i|1〉, . . . , T i|N − 1〉} where i = 0, 1, . . . , N if p = 2
and i = 0, 1, . . . , (N − 1)/2 if p > 2 are mutually unbiased.
(A proof can be found in Lemma 7 in Section V below.) Con-
sequently, if it turns out that the measured qubit is prepared in
the standard basis, that qubit will be accepted by Scheme A
as error-free. In contrast, if the measured qubit is not prepared
in the standard basis, it has (N − 1)/N chance of being
detected as erroneous. Therefore, the tolerable SBMER is
upper-bounded by N/(N+1)×(N−1)/N = (N−1)/(N+1)
if p = 2 and [(N + 1)/2 − 1]/[(N + 1)/2] × (N − 1)/N =
(N − 1)2/[N(N + 1)] if p > 2.
Thus, the difference between the tolerable SBMER and its
theoretical upper bound tends to zero in the limit of large N .
So in the limit, the error tolerance capability of Scheme A
approaches its maximally allowable value.
Fourth, readers may wonder why Scheme A is highly error-
tolerant especially when N is large. Recall that Eve does
not know which particles are in set Si when the particles
are transmitted from Alice to Bob. Hence, in the limit of
large number of quantum particle transfer L, eab satisfies
the constraints in Eqs. (24) and (25). This greatly limits the
relative occurrence rates between different types of quantum
errors. At this point, the LOCC2 EP becomes a powerful tool
to reduce the spin errors at the expense of increasing phase
errors. Furthermore, provided that the condition in Lemma 5
holds, ek EPZ0 > e
k EP
Zb
for all b 6= 0. In other words, the dominant
kind of phase error is having no phase error at all. Thus, the
majority vote PEC procedure is effective in bringing down the
phase error. This is the underlying reason why Scheme A is
so powerful that in the limit N →∞, eSBMER → 1−.
Fifth, the privacy amplification performed in Scheme A is
based entirely on entanglement purification and phase error
correction. In fact, the key ingredient in reducing the QER
used in the proof of Theorem 4 is the validity of conditions
shown in Eq. (42). Nonetheless, there is no need to bring down
the QER to an exponentially small number. In fact, one may
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devise an equally secure scheme by following the adaptive
procedure introduced by Chau in Ref. [23]. That is to say,
Alice and Bob may switch to a concatenated Calderbank-
Shor-Steane quantum code when the PEC brings down the
QER to about 5%. The strategy of adding an extra step
of quantum error correction towards the end of the privacy
amplification procedure may increase the key generation rate.
This is because from the proof of Theorem 4 together with
Eq. (40), I conclude that in order to bring the QER down
to less than ǫ after k rounds of LOCC2 EP, Alice and Bob
have to choose r and hence the number of quantum registers
needed in PEC to be ∼ ǫc2k for some constant c > 1. In
contrast, by randomizing the quantum registers, the QER after
each application of the Steane’s seven quantum register code
is reduced quadratically whenever the QER is less than about
5%. Consequently, Alice and Bob may increase the key gener-
ation rate by performing less rounds of LOCC2 EP, choosing
ǫ ≈ 0.01, and finally adding a few rounds of Calderbank-Shor-
Steane code quantum error correction procedure.
V. REDUCTION TO THE PREPARE-AND-MEASURE
SCHEME
Finally, I apply the standard Shor and Preskill proof [20] to
reduce the entanglement-based Scheme A to a provably secure
prepare-and-measure scheme in this section. Let me first write
down the detail procedures of Scheme B before showing its
security.
Prepare-and-measure QKD Scheme B
1) Alice randomly and independently prepares L ≫ 1
quantum particles in the standard basis. She applies
one of the following unitary transformation to each
particle randomly and independently: I, T, T 2, . . . , TN .
Alice records the states and transformations she applied
and then sends the states to Bob. He acknowledges
the reception of these particles and then applies one of
the following transformation to each received particles
randomly and independently: I−1, T−1, T−2, . . . , T−N .
Now, Alice and Bob publicly reveal their unitary trans-
formations applied to each particle. A particle is kept
and is said to be in the set Si if Alice and Bob have
applied T i and T−i to it respectively. Bob measures
the particles in Si in the standard basis and records the
measurement results.
2) Alice and Bob estimate the quantum channel error
rate by sacrificing a few particles. Specifically, they
randomly pick O([N +1]2 log{[N +1]/ǫ}/δ2N2) pairs
from each of the (N+1) sets Si and publicly reveal the
preparation and measured states for each of them. In this
way, they obtain the estimated channel error rate within
standard deviation δ with probability at least (1− ǫ). If
the channel error rate is too high, they abort the scheme
and start all over again.
3) Alice and Bob perform the following privacy amplifica-
tion procedure.
a) They apply the privacy amplification procedure
with two way classical communication similar to
the ones reported in Refs. [22], [23]. Specifically,
Alice and Bob randomly group their corresponding
remaining quantum particles in pairs. Suppose the
jth particle of the ith pair was initially prepared
in the state |sij 〉. Then, Alice publicly announces
the value si1 − si2 ∈ GF (N) for each pair i.
Similarly, Bob publicly announces the value s′i1 −
s′i2 where |s′ij 〉 is the measurement result of the
jth particle in the ith pair. They keep one of their
corresponding registers of the pair only when their
announced values the corresponding pairs agree.
They repeat the above procedure until there is
an integer r > 0 such that a single application
of step 3b will bring the quantum channel error
rate of the resultant particles down to ǫI/ℓ2 for a
fixed security parameter ǫI > 0, where rℓ is the
number of remaining quantum particles they have.
They abort the scheme either when r is greater
than the number of remaining quantum particles
they possess or when they have used up all their
quantum particles in this procedure.
b) They apply the majority vote phase error correction
procedure introduced by Gottesman and Lo [22].
Specifically, Alice and Bob randomly divide their
corresponding resultant particles into sets each
containing r particles. They replace each set by
the sum of the values prepared or measured of the
r particles in the set. These replaced values are bits
of their final secure key string.
Theorem 5 (Based on Shor and Preskill [20]): Scheme A
in Section III and Scheme B above are equally secure. Thus,
conclusions of Theorem 4 is also applicable to Scheme B.
Proof: Recall from Ref. [20] that Alice may measure all
her share of quantum registers right at step 1 in Scheme A
without affecting the security of the scheme. Besides, LOCC2
EP and PEC procedures in Scheme A simply permute the
measurement basis. More importantly, the final secret key
generation does not make use of the phase information of
the transmitted quantum registers. Hence, the Shor-Preskill
argument in Ref. [20] can be applied to Scheme A, giving
us an equally secure prepare-and-measure Scheme B above.
From the discussions in Subsection IV-A, we should not and
cannot compare the error tolerant capability of Scheme B that
uses unentangled quantum particles of different dimensions
as information carrier. Nonetheless, we may compare the
error tolerant capability of the entangled-qubit-based prepare-
and-measure QKD scheme derived from Scheme B against
the same eavesdropping attack. Recall that in the absence
of quantum storage, we may regard the transfer of a 16-
dimensional quantum particle as the transfer of 4 consecutive
qubits in the insecure quantum channel. Now, I consider the
following eavesdropping strategy: Qubits passing through the
insecure communication channel are partitioned into sets each
containing 4 consecutive qubits. Eve randomly and indepen-
dently measure each set in the standard basis with probability
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q. Suppose q satisfies
0.8292 ≈ 3
10
(5−
√
5) < q <
68
1335
(19−
√
5) ≈ 0.8539. (47)
From Lemma 6 and Eq. (46), the BER caused by this eaves-
dropping strategy on the entangled-qubit-based prepare-and-
measure QKD scheme derived from Scheme B for N = 2n is
given by eBEREve (N) = q(N−1)(Nn+2)/[2Nn(N+1)]. Using
Eqs. (39), (45)–(47), I conclude that eBEREve (2) > (5−
√
5)/10.
In other words, eBEREve (2) is greater than tolerable BERs of
all known unentangled-qubit-based prepare-and-measure QKD
schemes to date. In contrast, eBEREve (16) < 33(19−
√
5)/1424.
Hence, from Theorem 5 together with Eqs. (39), (45) and (46),
Scheme B can generate a provably secure key under this
eavesdropping attack when N = 16. Actually, one may
construct an eavesdropping attack that can be tolerated by the
entangled-qubit-based prepare-and-measure scheme derived
from Scheme B for a fixed N = 2n ≥ 16 in a similar way.
(The strategy is partition the qubits into sets each containing n
consecutive qubits. Eve makes standard basis measurement on
each set with probability q chosen from an interval similar to
the one stated in Eq. (47).) All known unentangled-qubit-based
prepare-and-measure schemes to date, in contrast, cannot
generate a provably secure key under the same attack.
On the other hand, suppose Eve chooses a slightly different
strategy by measuring randomly and independently a qubit
in each set of 4 consecutive qubits with probability q′ =
1 − [(43 + 68√5)/1335]1/4 ≈ 0.3817 in the standard basis.
Under this modified eavesdropping attack, the probability that
a randomly chosen 4 consecutive qubits are not chosen equals
(1 − q′)4 in the limit of large number of qubit transfer.
Thus, the BER induced by this attack on the entangled-qubit-
based prepare-and-measure scheme derived from Scheme B
for N = 16 is given by [1 − (1 − q′)4](N − 1)(Nn +
2)/[2Nn(N + 1)] = 33(19 − √5)/1424. This BER rate is
just too high for the entangled-qubit-based scheme derived
from Scheme B for N = 16 to handle. In contrast, the BER
caused by the same eavesdropping attack for the six-state
scheme equals q′/3 ≈ 0.1272. This attack, therefore, can
be handled easily by the unentangled-qubit-based prepared-
and-measure QKD scheme introduced by Chau in Ref. [23].
To summarize, the entangled-qubit-based prepare-and-measure
scheme derived from Scheme B for N > 2 is more error
resilience when dealing with burst type of errors than the
unentangled-qubit-based prepare-and-measure schemes.
Now, I need to point out an important remark on the
number of different kinds of states Alice have to prepare in
Scheme B. To distribute the key using an N -level quantum
system with N = 2n, Corollary 1 tells us that T k 6= I
for all k = 1, 2, . . . , N . Therefore, T i|j〉’s are distinct states
for 0 ≤ i ≤ N and j ∈ GF (N). Thus, Scheme B is a
N(N + 1)-state scheme. In contrast, if N = pn with p > 2,
then T (N+1)/2 = −I by Corollary 1. Hence, in this case,
upon measurement on the standard basis, Scheme B is a
N(N+1)/2-state scheme. This observation suggests that there
may be rooms for improving the error tolerance rate of an
prepare-and-measure QKD scheme involving N -dimensional
quantum particles for an odd N .
Finally, I remark that the lemma below suggests the possi-
bility of a subtle relation between Scheme B and the so-called
mutually unbiased bases.
Lemma 7: If N = 2n, then the bases {|k〉}k∈GF (N),
{T |k〉}k∈GF (N), {T 2|k〉}k∈GF (N), . . . , {TN |k〉}k∈GF (N) are
mutually unbiased. While if N = pn with p > 2, the bases
{|k〉}k∈GF (N), {T |k〉}k∈GF (N), . . . , {T (N+1)/2|k〉}k∈GF (N)
are mutually unbiased.
Proof: I shall only consider the case when N = 2n. The
other case can be proven in the same way. Let 0 ≤ i < i′ ≤ N .
I consider the equation
〈k′|T i†T i′ |k〉 = 〈0|ZjX−k′T i
′−iXk|0〉, (48)
which holds for all j ∈ GF (N). Since 0 < i′ − i ≤ N ,
Corollary 1 implies that M(T i′−i) is in the form
[
a b
b c
]
for some b 6= 0. Therefore, applying Eqs. (5) and (8) to
the right hand side of Eq. (48) gives an expression pro-
portional to 〈0|T i′−iXk−k′a+jbZ−k′b+jc|0〉 = 〈0|T i′−i|k −
k′a + jb〉. More importantly, the magnitude of the propor-
tionality constant equals 1 for all j, k, k′ ∈ GF (N). Hence,
|〈k′|T i|k〉|2 = |〈k′′|T i|k〉|2 for all k, k′, k′′ ∈ GF (N) when-
ever 0 < i ≤ N . Hence, {|k〉}k∈GF (N), {T |k〉}k∈GF (N), . . . ,
{TN |k〉}k∈GF (N) are mutually unbiased.
Since the maximum number of mutually unbiased bases
equals (N + 1) for any prime power N [31], [32], [33], the
construction in Scheme B provides a simple way to build such
mutually unbiased bases for N = 2n. Perhaps one may build
a more error tolerant QKD scheme using mutually unbiased
bases for the case of an odd prime power N .
VI. DISCUSSIONS
In summary, I have introduced a prepared-and-measured
QKD scheme (Scheme B) and proved its unconditional se-
curity. In particular, I show that for a sufficiently large Hilbert
space dimension of quantum particles N used, Scheme B
generates a provably secure key close to 100% SBMER or
50% BER. This result demonstrates the advantage of using
unentangled higher dimensional quantum particles as signal
carriers in QKD.
A variation to the theme is worth discussing. Suppose Alice
can only send qubits. Besides, she can entangle the qubits
but she cannot store them. Then, she may group n qubits
together as a 2n-dimensional system and apply Scheme B.
Under this situation, Scheme B can generate a provably secure
key under certain eavesdropping attack whenever n ≥ 4.
In contrast, no unentangled-qubit-based prepare-and-measure
QKD scheme known to date can tolerate the same eavesdrop-
ping attack. Nonetheless, there exists another eavesdropping
attack that Scheme B cannot tolerate unless N = 2. Recall
that Scheme B is equivalent to the unentangled-qubit-based
prepare-and-measure scheme proposed by Chau in Ref. [23].
Therefore, the ability to create, transfer but not to store en-
tangle qubits is advantageous in quantum cryptography using
certain quantum channels with burst errors.
There is a tradeoff between the error tolerance rate and key
generation efficiency, however. It is clear from the proof of
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Theorem 4 that r and hence the number of quantum particle
transfer from Alice and Bob L scales as 2k. Besides, the
probability that the measurement results agree and hence the
control quantum register pairs are kept in LOCC2 EP equals
≈ 1/N in the worst case. As a result, while the Scheme B is
highly error-tolerant, it generates a secret key with exponen-
tially small efficiency in the worst case scenario. Fortunately,
the adaptive nature of Scheme B makes sure that this scenario
will not happen when the error rate of the channel is small. To
conclude, in most practical situations, Alice and Bob should
choose the smallest possible N whose corresponding eSBMER
is slightly larger than the channel standard basis measurement
error rate. In this way, they can almost surely generate their
provably secure key at the highest possible rate.
As I have noted in Section V, there may be room for
improving the error tolerance rate in the case p > 2 since
Scheme B uses only N(N + 1)/2 different quantum states
in signal transmission. It is instructive to explore such a
possibility.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work is supported in part by the Outstanding Young
Researcher Award of the University of Hong Kong. The author
would like to thank H.-K. Lo for sharing with him his preprint
with D. Gottesman [22] prior to its public dissemination. A
critical reading of an earlier draft by Debbie Leung is also
gratefully acknowledged.
REFERENCES
[1] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, Quantum Computation And Quantum
Information. Cambridge: CUP, 2000. p. 586.
[2] H.-K. Lo, H. F. Chau, and M. Ardehali, “Efficient quantum key distri-
bution scheme and proof of its unconditional security,” 2001. (quant-
ph/0011056v2), to appear in J. Crypt.
[3] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, “Unconditional security of quantum
key distribution over arbitrarily long distances,” Science, vol. 283,
pp. 2050–2056, 1999. As well as the supplementary material available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/feature/data/984035.shl.
[4] D. Mayers, “Unconditional security in quantum cryptography,” J. Assoc.
Comp. Mach., vol. 48, pp. 351–406, 2001. See also his preliminary
version in D. Mayers, Advances in Cryptology — Proceedings of
Crypto’96 (Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1996), pp. 343–357.
[5] D. Gottesman and H.-K. Lo, “From quantum cheating to quantum
security,” Phys. Today, vol. 53, no. 11, pp. 22–27, 2000. And references
cited therein.
[6] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, “Quantum cryptogra-
phy,” Rev. Mod. Phys., vol. 74, pp. 145–195, 2002. And references cited
therein.
[7] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Public key
distribution and coin tossing,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International
Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, (New York),
pp. 175–179, Bangalore, India, IEEE, 1984.
[8] D. Bruß, “Optimal eavesdropping in quantum cryptography with six
states,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 81, pp. 3018–3021, 1998.
[9] T. C. Ralph, “Continuous variable quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev.
A, vol. 61, pp. 010303(R):1–4, 2000.
[10] M. Hillery, “Quantum cryptography with sequeezed states,” Phys. Rev.
A, vol. 61, pp. 022309:1–8, 2000.
[11] D. Gottesman and J. Preskill, “Secure quantum key distribution using
squeezed states,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 63, pp. 022309:1–18, 2001.
[12] H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and A. Peres, “Quantum cryptography with
3-state systems,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 85, pp. 3313–3316, 2000.
[13] H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and W. Tittel, “Quantum cryptography using
larger alphabets,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 61, pp. 062308:1–6, 2000.
[14] M. Bourennane, A. Karlsson, and G. Bjo¨rk, “Quantum key distribution
using multilevel encoding,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 64, pp. 012306:1–5, 2001.
[15] N. J. Cerf, M. Bourennane, A. Karlsson, and N. Gisin, “Security of
quantum key distribution using d-level systems,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 88,
pp. 127902:1–4, 2002.
[16] M. Bourennane, A. Karlsson, G. Bjo¨rk, N. Gisin, and N. J. Cerf,
“Quantum key distribution using multilevel encoding: security analysis,”
J. Phys.: A, vol. 35, pp. 10065–10076, 2002.
[17] D. Bruß and C. Macchiavello, “Optimal eavesdropping in cryptogra-
phy with three-dimensional quantum states,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 88,
pp. 127901:1–4, 2002.
[18] E. Biham, M. Boyer, P. O. Boykin, T. Mor, and V. Roychowdhury, “A
proof of the security of quantum key distribution,” in Proceedings of the
32nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC2000),
(New York), pp. 715–724, ACM Press, 2000.
[19] C. H. Bennett, D. A. DiVincenzo, J. A. Smolin, and W. K. Wootters,
“Mixed-state entanglement and quantum error correction,” Phys. Rev. A,
vol. 54, pp. 3824–3851, 1996.
[20] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, “Simple proof of security of the BB84
quantum key distribution protocol,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 85, pp. 441–
444, 2000.
[21] H.-K. Lo, “Proof of unconditional security of six-state quantum key
distribution scheme,” Quant. Inform. and Comp., vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 81–
94, 2001.
[22] D. Gottesman and H.-K. Lo, “Proof of security of quantum key
distribution with two-way classical communications,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theo., vol. 49, pp. 457–475, 2003.
[23] H. F. Chau, “Practical scheme to share a secret key through a quan-
tum channel with a 27.5% bit error rate,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 66,
pp. 060302(R):1–4, 2002.
[24] D. Gottesman, “Class of quantum error-correcting codes saturating the
quantum Hamming bound,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 54, pp. 1862–1868, 1996.
[25] A. Ashikhmin and E. Knill, “Non-binary quantum stabilizer codes,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theo., vol. 47, pp. 3065–3072, 2001.
[26] R. Lidl and H. Neiderreiter, Introduction to finite fields and their
applications. Melbourne: CUP, revised ed., 1994.
[27] G. Alber, A. Delgado, N. Gisin, and I. Jex, “Efficient bipartite quantum
state purification in arbitrary dimensional Hilbert spaces,” J. Phys.:A,
vol. 34, pp. 8821–8833, 2001.
[28] N. L. Johnson, S. Kotz, and N. Balakrishnan, Discrete Multivariate
Distributions. New York: Wiley, 1997. chap. 39.
[29] D. Gottesman, “Fault-tolerant quantum computation with higher-
dimensional systems,” Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, vol. 10, pp. 1749–
1758, 1999.
[30] S. Roman, Coding And Information Theory. Berlin: Springer, 1992.
p. 26.
[31] W. K. Wootters and B. D. Fields, “Optimal state-determination by
mutually unbiased measurements,” Ann. Phys., vol. 191, pp. 363–381,
1989.
[32] J. Lawrence, C. Brukner, and A. Zeilinger, “Mutually unbiased binary
observable sets on N qubits,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 65, pp. 032320:1–5,
2002.
[33] S. Bandyopadhyay, P. O. Boykin, V. Roychowdhury, and F. Vatan, “A
new proof for the existence of mutually unbiased bases,” Algorithmica,
vol. 34, pp. 512–528, 2002.
